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Abstract
The primary intent of this paper is detect malicious traﬃc at the network level. To this end, we apply several machine
learning techniques to build classiﬁers that ﬁngerprint maliciousness on IP traﬃc. As such, J48, Naı¨ve Bayesian, SVM
and Boosting algorithms are used to classify malware communications that are generated from dynamic malware anal-
ysis framework. The generated traﬃc log ﬁles are pre-processed in order to extract features that characterize malicious
packets. The data mining algorithms are applied on these features. The comparison between diﬀerent algorithms results
has shown that J48 and Boosted J48 algorithms have performed better than other algorithms. We managed to obtain a
detection rate of 99% of malicious traﬃc with a false positive rate less than 1% for J48 and Boosted J48 algorithms.
Additional tests have generated results that show that our model can detect malicious traﬃc obtained from diﬀerent
sources.
c© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
The cyberspace security challenge takes an allure of a continuous background conﬂict due to the fact
that computer attack tools are more sophisticated and hackers are capable of launching worldwide impacting
assaults. For instance, in July 2009, Damballa ranked Zeus botnet as the number one threat with 3.6 million
infections in the United States. Zeus bots were estimated as responsible for 44% of banking malware
infections [1]. Another signiﬁcant example is Mariposa botnet, which is a new generation botnet. It was
claimed that 13 million machines got infected in 190 countries across the globe by this botnet once it
appeared in May 2009 [2]. Mariposa bots are able to download and execute malicious code on the ﬂy,
which makes the botnet extremely harmful. Mariposa can be associated with other botnets since it has the
capability to infect machines with other bots. The icing on the cake was the Stuxnet malware. Investigations
done by Symantec engineers revealed that among 38, 000 infections, about 22, 000 were in Iran [3]. The
reason behind its distribution resides in the fact that malware was created to infect Programmable Logic
Controllers (PLCs) of nuclear stations. It was the ﬁrst time a critical industry was attacked through malware.
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Such an event is interpreted as a step forward towards the emergence of a new cyber war, which might
have severe negative impacts on the national and the international security. Furthermore, the existence of
widely available encryption and anonymizing techniques makes the surveillance and the investigation of
cyber attacks a much harder problem. In this context, the availability of relevant techniques to ﬁngerprint
maliciousness at the IP traﬃc level is of paramount importance.
The deployed state-of-the-art techniques and tools that are used to detect malicious packets rely on Intru-
sion Detection Systems (IDSs). The latter use signature-based and anomaly-based detection techniques in
order to ﬁlter bad traﬃc. While they proved to be eﬀective components in network security, they fail in cap-
turing badness when: (1) the traﬃc is encrypted, or (2) the traﬃc is sampled to preserve scalable detection in
the presence of large traﬃc. As such, there is a desideratum that consists of elaborating new techniques that
can ﬁngerprint maliciousness at the IP level while preserving scalability, accuracy and eﬀectiveness even
in the presence of encrypted traﬃc. In this regard, the primary objective of this paper is to devise a new
technique that is eﬃcient, precise and eﬀective for the detection of traﬃc that emanates from the execution
of malware samples. The elaborated techniques establish a synergy between malware dynamic analysis and
machine learning. Actually, we resort to a sandbox to execute and analyze in a controlled environment a
large daily feed of malware binaries. We collect the generated pcap traﬃc ﬁles and label each packet as
malicious. On the other hand, we collect non-malicious traﬃc from a trusted source ,i.e, DARPA [4] and
label it as benign. The combined labeled pcap ﬁles (benign and malicious) are subjected to feature extrac-
tion. In this respect, we use a feature set that has the capability to capture maliciousness. In this setting, we
would like to acknowledge that our work is inspired by [5, 6, 7] who had a diﬀerent intent that is application
identiﬁcation from encrypted traﬃc. Afterwards, we apply machine learning algorithms in order to build
classiﬁers that have the power to ﬁngerprint malicious traﬃc at the network level. We experimented with
5 classiﬁcation algorithms namely, J48, Boosted J48, Naı¨ve Bayesian (NB), Boosted NB, and SVM. The
underlying results show a detection rate of 99% of malicious traﬃc with a false positive rate that is less than
1% for J48 and Boosted J48 algorithms. Additional tests have shown that our classiﬁers are robust in the
sense that they preserve a high accuracy even when analyzing IP traﬃc from other sources. The remainder
of the paper is organized as follows. An overview of the dynamic malware analysis framework is provided
in Section 3. The methodology is described in Section 4 and experimental results are reported in Section 5.
Finally, concluding remarks on this work are given in Section 6 together with a discussion of future research.
2. Related Works
The packet content approach has shown good results in terms of malware detection at the network level
but it fails in capturing badness when the traﬃc is encrypted. Moreover, it needs sampling to preserve scal-
able detection at the presence of a large traﬃc. Our approach is a malware network behavioral based rather
than content based to avoid these two limitations. In the sequel, we introduce the related works related to the
identiﬁcation of maliciousness using a malware network behavioral approach. This approach aims to ﬁnd
out common characteristics that are shared by malicious ﬂows at the network level. The main intent of works
that introduced such technique is the identiﬁcation and detection of botnets. Some of approaches that detect
botnet rely mainly on heuristics observed on botnet architecture like in [8, 9] for IRC botnet and [10, 11]
for P2P botnets. In [12], Karasaridis et al. put forward an approach to identify botnet C&Cs by combining
heuristics characterizing IRC ﬂows, scanning activities and botnet communication. In [13], the authors in-
troduced BotHunter, which models all bot attacks as a vector enclosing scanning activities, infection exploit,
binary download and execution, C&Cs communication. The tool is coupled with Snort IDS with malware
extensions to raise alerts when diﬀerent bot activities are detected. Other works used aggregation to detect
botnets. For instance, BotSniﬀer [14] tried to show that infected hosts have spatial-temporal similarity. It
pinpoints to suspicious hosts that have malicious activities such as sending emails, scanning and shared
communication payloads by using shared bi-grams in IRC and HTTP botnets. In [15, 16], the authors put
forward BotMiner and TAMD, which aim to identify and cluster hosts that share common characteristics.
In [17], the authors introduced a novel system, namely, BotFinder, which detects infected hosts in a network
by considering high-level properties of the botnet network traﬃc. It uses machine learning to identify key
features of C&C communication based on bots traﬃc produced in controlled environment. Our approach
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has the same ﬂavor of BotFinder. However, we aim to create detection model based on machine learning
techniques by considering any malware type and not only bots. In [17], the authors introduced a novel sys-
tem, namely, BotFinder, which detects infected hosts in a network by considering high-level properties of
the botnet network traﬃc. It uses machine learning to identify key features of C&C communication based on
bots traﬃc produced in controlled environment. Our approach has the same ﬂavor of BotFinder. However,
we aim to create detection model based on machine learning techniques by considering any malware type
and not only bots.
3. Framework Architecture
In this section, we introduce the architecture of our framework, which aims at ﬁngerprinting malicious-
ness in network traﬃc. Our framework is composed of four components, namely: (i) dynamic malware
analysis, (ii) benign network traﬃc collection, (iii) network traces parsing, labelling and feature extraction,
(iv) classiﬁcation. Figure 1 illustrates the diﬀerent components that constitute our framework. In the sequel,
we introduce the diﬀerent components as well as the interaction between them.
Network Traces
Parser
Benign Traffic
Dynamic Malware
Analysis Sandbox
Malware Samples
Malicious Traffic
Features Files
Classifier
Fingerprints
Fig. 1: Framework Overview
3.1. Dynamic Malware Analysis
The main intent here is to execute a large collection of malware samples in a controlled environment in
order to generate and collect representative network traces in the form of pcap ﬁles. The latter will be used
later to build a classiﬁer that has the power to ﬁngerprint maliciousness. To do so, we use a dynamic analysis
environment that is the GFI sandbox [18]. It is based on a client-server architecture, where the server
dispatches malware binaries to clients. These clients are either virtual or physical machines. They are used
as platforms to run malicious programs with a system restore capability. The GFI sandbox clients’ program
is responsible to execute malware. The dynamic malware analysis falls into two phases. The ﬁrst phase
resides in collecting malware from GFI malware feeds. Malware are sent interactively to the GFI sandbox,
which then runs them on many clients. It monitors the behavior for each malware and records it into XML
report ﬁles. The latter capture the diﬀerent activities performed by malware samples. These activities consist
of ﬁle activities, hooking activities, network activities, process activities, and registry activities. The report
ﬁles are precious sources that mirror diﬀerent behavioral aspects of malware. To date, we analyzed around
1.7 million malware binaries during a period of one year and a half (from January 2011 to June 2012). As
a downstream result of the aforementioned dynamic analysis, we collected the underlying network traﬃc
pcap ﬁles that have been generated. It is relevant to mention that the dynamic analysis setup allows malware
samples to connect to the Internet.
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3.2. Benign Network Traﬃc Collection
For the purpose of building the classiﬁcation model, we need two kinds of IP traﬃc: malicious and be-
nign. The malicious fragment is derived from malware dynamic analysis. The benign fragment is collected
from the DARPA dataset [4]. This dataset has been built to evaluate IDSs in order to measure the probabil-
ity of false alerts. In our work, we use such a dataset to build baseline knowledge for benign traﬃc. More
details about collected logs are provided in Section 4.
3.3. Network Traces Parsing, Labeling and Feature Extraction
The intention here is to take both malicious and benign traﬃc pcap ﬁles and proceed with their labeling.
The labeled packets are subjected to feature extraction. The features are extracted from the data link, net-
work and transport layers [19] in order to capture the characteristics of malicious traﬃc. It is important to
mention that these features can be extracted even when the traﬃc is encrypted. Furthermore, for the sake of
generality, we neither rely on port information nor on source and destination IP addresses. In terms of im-
plementation, the module in charge of network traces parsing, labeling and feature extraction reads network
streams by using Jnetpcap API [20]. It is a Java wrapper for Libpcap [21] library native calls, which can
decode captured network packets in real-time or oﬄine. It supports a larger library of network protocols.
The network traces parser is integrated to pick up values for diﬀerent attributes (features) from network
packets. All resulted values are stored in feature ﬁles that are readable with data mining artifacts such as
Weka [22], or marfpcat [23].
3.4. Classiﬁcation
The feature ﬁles that result from the previous phase are subjected to classiﬁcation. The aim is to build a
model that has the capability to ﬁngerprint malicious packets. To do so, we experiment with several machine
learning algorithms namely Naı¨ve Bayesian, Boosted Naı¨ve Bayesian, J48, Boosted J48 and SVM. The
classiﬁcation module is based on Java wrapper that runs these implemented machine learning algorithms.
The classiﬁcation module outputs accuracy, detection rate and false positive for each algorithm. The module
has two execution phases: learning and testing. In the learning phase, we build a classiﬁer that segregates
malicious from non-malicious traﬃc. In the testing phase, we evaluate the classiﬁer on the unseen data.
4. Methodology
In our work, we aim to test machine learning algorithms in order to ﬁngerprint malicious and non-
malicious traﬃc. We employ J48, Naı¨ve Bayesian, SVM and Boosting methods in order to identify the best
solution to the problem. The reason why we choose these classiﬁers is the fact that they have been used on
previous works applied on network traﬃc [7].
4.1. Dataset
4.1.1. Malicious Traﬃc
The malware collection in our framework is based on the GFI sandbox feeds. We received more than
1.5 million malware samples with an average of 3601.5 malware per day. We noticed that the feeds repre-
sent a good source of intelligence. The malware data was run in controlled environment encompassing 30
machines. Such analysis has generated 100000 pcap ﬁles labeled with hashes of malware.
4.1.2. Benign Traﬃc
The benign data is collected from DARPA [4]. DARPA dataset contains pcap ﬁles that contain non
malicious (sanitized) traﬃc, which was used for anomalies detection [4]. This dataset has been used to test
the diﬀerent machine learning algorithms and see which algorithm provides the best accuracy. However, in
[24], authors have put in dout the use of such dataset. In [25], authors studied DARPA dataset usefulness,
and address the issues arisen in [24]. In addition, we considered other tests with diﬀerent benign traﬃc
dataset, namely, Wireshark [26] and PacketLife traces [27]. Table 1 enumerates the number of packets used
for training and testing for each scenario. Scenario 1, Scenario 2 and 3 corresponds to training and testing
packets between malicious traﬃc and benign DARPA traﬃc, benign Wireshark, and benign PacketLife
traﬃc respectively.
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Table 1: Training and Testing Scenarios
Training Testing
TCP Scenario 1 1404793 600000
UDP Scenario 1 72907 30000
TCP Scenario 2 320600 137400
UDP Scenario 2 840 360
TCP Scenario 3 9366 4014
UDP Scenario 3 280 120
4.2. Features Selection
The network traces parser represents each packet by a factor of 29 packet-header features, which enclose
the most benchmark feature set studied by the networking community. The network features are depicted in
[28]. The features are extracted from the Data Link, Network and Transport layers in order to identify the
malicious traﬃc. Features 1 to 5 are gathered from the Data link layer, while Network layer are represented
by the features 6 to 13. Finally, Features 14 to 29 correspond to transport layer features. Features extracted
from payload are excluded here in order to make the identiﬁcation of encrypted traﬃc possible.
5. Results
5.1. Testing Phase
In this section, we present the results of J48, Naı¨ve Bayesian (NB), SVM, Boosted J48 (BJ48), and
Boosted Naı¨ve Bayesian (BNB) classiﬁers on our datasets. The obtained results fall into the detection rate
(DR) and false positives (FP). The main intent is to identify a classiﬁer with high accuracy and detection
rate as well as low false positives. Table 5 lists the results for the machine learning algorithms. The results
illustrated in Table 2 demonstrate that Boosted J48 and J48 have shown better results than other machine
learning algorithms. They achieved respectively 99% on TCP traﬃc and 95% on UDP traﬃc in terms
of accuracy. Moreover, J48 and Boosted J48 showed a low rate of false positives for both malicious and
non-malicious traﬃc. The false positives rate for TCP is slightly lowered by using the boosting technique.
Regarding UDP traﬃc, the boosting technique lowered the false positives rate in benign traﬃc but not for
malicious traﬃc. SVM algorithm had a lower accuracy in comparison with J48 and Boosted J48. It has
an accuracy of 83% for TCP traﬃc and 81% for UDP traﬃc. However, the detection rate is 65% for UDP
benign traﬃc, whereas the false positives rate for the same traﬃc is high reaching 34%. Since we have a
large dataset, SVM performs poorer in comparison with J48. Naı¨ve Bayesian and Boosted Naı¨ve Bayesian
algorithms have shown their limitation in comparison with J48 and Boosted J48. They achieve around 78%
and 92% in terms of accuracy on TCP traﬃc. The false positives rate is around 8% and 31% for benign
and malicious TCP traﬃc for Naı¨ve Bayesian classiﬁer. The Boosting of Naı¨ve Bayesian shown its positive
eﬀect since it improved the accuracy and reduced false positives rate to 7% for benign and malicious traﬃc
types. Regarding UDP traﬃc classiﬁcation, these algorithms’ accuracies are lower since they are evaluated
around 77%. The false positives rates are high for benign UDP traﬃc; they are evaluated around 41%.
The reason that Naı¨ve Bayesian algorithm performed poorer than J48 algorithm resides in the fact that some
features are dependant (as not expected by the assumptions made for Naı¨ve Bayesian algorithm). The results
concluded that J48 and Boosted J48 carried on the best if we consider the accuracy, the false positives and
detection rates for malicious and non malicious traﬃc. J48 and Boosted J48 algorithms are based on insight
gain obtained from features. We observed that some feautures have not been included in the decision trees.
As a result, we excluded them in order to improve the performance of decision trees. The use of boosting
technique has changed J48 results slightly. That is why we decided to consider J48 algorithm instead of its
boosted version in order to avoid impacting negatively runtime performance for the decision tree.
After ﬁnding out that J48 algorithm performed better than other algorithms, we decided to make ad-
ditional tests with benign network traces collected from Wireshark and PacketLife by replacing DARPA
benign traﬃc. The intent is to prove that our approach is robust. Even by changing the benign traﬃc, the
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Table 2: Experiments Results for Diﬀerent Algorithms
DR FP DR FP DR FP DR FP DR FP
J48 J48 BJ48 BJ48 NB NB BNB BNB SVM SVM
TCP Benign 0.9999 1.31E-4 0.9999 1.00E-5 0.9185 0.0814 0.9254 0.0695 0.6739 0.3261
TCP Malicious 0.9999 2.00E-5 0.9999 1.25E-6 0.6846 0.3154 0.9305 0.0745 0.9937 0.0072
Accuracy 99.9932% 99.9995% 78.4878% 92.7616% 83.3822%
UDP Benign 0.9831 0.0169 0.9942 0.0058 0.5826 0.4174 0.5826 0.4174 0.6539 0.3461
UDP Malicious 0.9238 0.0762 0.9029 0.0971 0.9637 0.0363 0.9667 0.0363 0.9740 0.0260
Accuracy 95.345% 94.8533% 77.3117% 77.3117% 81.3933%
obtained model is able to diﬀerentiate the malicious from the benign traﬃc. Thus, we aim to build classiﬁers
by using diﬀerent benign datasets (Wireshark and PacketLife datasets) and check whether the accuracy is
high or not. Moreover, this comparison allows us to discover the key features that let the malicious traﬃc
being diﬀerentiable from benign traﬃc. Table 3 illustrates the obtained accuracy, detection rate and false
positives rate for malicious traces versus benign traﬃc collected from Wireshark and PacketLife traces.
Table 3: J48 Algorithm Results
Traﬃc Type Detection Rate False Positives Rate
TCP Malicious 0.998 0.002
TCP Wireshark Benign 0.999 0.001
Accuracy 99.847%
UDP Malicious 0.931 0.069
UDP Wireshark Benign 0.9 0.01
Accuracy 91.5%
TCP Malicious 1.0 0.0
TCP LifePacket Benign 1.0 0.0
Accuracy 100%
UDP Malicious 0.988 0.012
UDP LifePacket Benign 0.964 0.036
Accuracy 97.59%
By looking deeply into the obtained models, we noted the following observations:
• Regarding UDP J48 decision trees, we observed that only 7 features are being used among 14 fea-
tures. Thus, we reﬁned the models by excluding unused features in order to improve the runtime
performance. To do so, we repeated the tests and we obtained the same results. The UDP unused
features are: Capture Length, Flag: FrameisMarked, IP Header Length and IP ﬂags RB, DF, MF and
OFFSET. The same issue was observed in TCP models, since we used just 16 features among 28
features. In addition to the unused UDP features, the TCP unused features are: TCP Next Sequence
Number, TCP Header Length, TCP Flags: CWR, ECN, URG, PUSH, SYN, and FIN.
• The most important features in TCP models are: TCP Window Size, TCP Sequence Number, TTL
and Delta time between packets. These features are mainly located in the top of the tree. At the other
hand, Delta time, TTL and Packet Length are the most important features in UDP models.
By observing the diﬀerent models, we decided to make an additional test, where unknown malicious
traﬃc is evaluated in order to see whether the model obtained from malicious versus DARPA traﬃc is
consistent with respect to malicious traﬃc obtained from other sources.
5.2. Veriﬁcation Phase
In order to verify the eﬀectiveness of the model, we made additional tests by collecting malicious traﬃc
traces from diﬀerent sources [29, 30, 31]. The malicious traﬃc corresponds to 23 distinctive malware, we
can cite for instance Zeus, BlackEnergy, Conﬁcker, Nugache, etc. The collected traﬃc is about 5.15 Mb of
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data. The malicious data contains around 15000 TCP packets and around 500 UDP packets. We fed the J48
model with feature ﬁles generated from malicious traﬃc collected from external sources in order to check
the detection of malicious packets accuracy. Table 4, Figures 2(a) and 2(b) illustrate the diﬀerent results that
we obtained from this test.
Table 4: Malicious Data Veriﬁcation
Packets Type Detection Rate Failure Rate
TCP Traﬃc 86.18% 13.82%
UDP Traﬃc 83.19% 16.81%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99.38%
94.54%
90.90% 90.78%
78.60% 76.46%
69.23%
62.90%
43.39%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
TCP Traffic Detection Rate
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Fig. 2: (a) TCP Detection Rate per Malware; (b) UDP Detection Rate per Malware
In general, the detection ratio of malicious traﬃc is acceptable. We managed to obtain a detection rate
average of 86.18% for TCP and 83.19% for UDP. If we consider the detection rate per malware, we notice
that we got a full detection of TCP malicious traﬃc for 12 malware, namely,Blackenergy, Nugache, Xpaj,
Zeus, Bakcorox, Sasﬁs, Morto, Macadocs, Flame, Daws, DownloaderTrojan and Iloveyou malware. We
obtained more than 90% detection rate for 5 malware. Some of the results were generally acceptable. The
results have a range of 60% to 80% for SdBot, Netsky, Syrian malware and Dnightmare. The worst result
is the detection rate of VOBFUS since we obtained 43%. Regarding UDP traﬃc, we managed to obtain full
detection rate for Iloveyou, Sasﬁs, Bakcorox, Droidfu, Slammer and Netsky. An acceptable detection rate
is also observed for 7 malware. The detection rate has a range of 74% to 97%. A detection rate of 55%
is observed for Dockster, VOBFUS and Blackenergy. The worst result is 25% for Dnightmare malware.
By looking at these results, we can say that the model detection ability is acceptable since the majority of
malware traﬃc has been detected. However, we noticed some exceptions that are related directly to the
fact that some traces have insigniﬁcant number of TCP or UDP packets. This is the case for Dnightmare
malware traﬃc trace, which contains 12 UDP packets, where 3 of them are detected. Thus, we can say that
more a given traﬃc has large number of packets; more the model is able to detect large number of malicious
packets. In realistic world, this model can have human support, since any detection of low number of
malicious packets should be monitored by a network administrator. The small number of detected packets
may belong to a ﬂow that is generated from an infected machine.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we employed several supervised machine learning algorithms, namely, J48, Boosted J48,
Naı¨ve Bayesian, Boosted Naı¨ve Bayesian and SVM in order to classify malicious and non malicious traﬃc.
The aforementioned learning algorithms were used to build classiﬁcation models. So far, results show that
J48 and Boosted J48 performed better than other algorithms. They reached more than 99% accuracy and
less than 1% false positives rate. In summary, we illustrated that it is possible to detect TCP and UDP
malicious traﬃc and diﬀerentiate it from non malicious one by using attributes extracted from packets. It is
a preliminary result toward the classiﬁcation of malicious traﬃc at the network level. Therefore, we want
to invesitgate the degree to which our classiﬁcation results are generalizable to a wide class of representive
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network. Our future works fall into classify the malicious traﬃc accordingly to malware types and families,
and deploying the model on a network in order to test its performance on realtime traﬃc.
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